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How We Think about Economics
Bart J. Wilson*
7 May 2017
There is no more light in a genius than in any other honest man – but he has a particular
kind of lens to concentrate this light into a burning point.
~ Ludwig Wittgenstein

If there is a favorite sentence that encapsulates Vernon Smith’s contribution to how I
think about economics, it is the first one in the second footnote of his Nobel lecture: “Doing
experimental economics has changed the way I think about economics” (reprinted in Smith,
2003; p. 465). He elaborates further:
There are many reasons for this, but one of the most prominent is that designing and
conducting experiments forces you to think through the process rules and procedures of
an institution. Few, like Einstein, can perform detailed and imaginative mental
experiments. Most of us need the challenge of real experiments to discipline our thinking
(p. 465).

By training and self-selection, economists are deep-seated consequentialists,
methodological positivists, and serial nominalizers. What matters to us are the outcomes of an
economic experiment: double auctions are 90 to 100% efficient without complete information
on the conditions of supply and demand; Dutch and first-price sealed bid auctions are
theoretically, but not behaviorally isomorphic; asset markets reliably bubble and crash in the
laboratory even with common knowledge of the dividend distribution; the solution concept of a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium rather poorly organizes actual play in two-person games; etc.
We tend to treat such outcomes in part as having learned something objective about the
world. We positivistically reject the assumption of complete information for a market to clear,
appending our discipline’s mantra of “Incentives matter” with the phrase “because institutions
matter.” We also positivistically reject the assumption that common priors make asset markets
efficient, and we positivistically reject the assumption that people always prefer more money to
less. Our inclination is to explain these findings in terms of what Levitt and List (2007) call “deep
structural parameters,” some nouns for which include risk aversion, fairness, reciprocity,
inequality aversion, ambiguity aversion, overconfidence, overoptimism, to name but a few.
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From my casual observation, many economists were surprised at the content of Vernon’s
Nobel lecture on ecological and constructivist rationality in economics. Having been awarded
the prize “for having established laboratory experiments as a tool in empirical economic analysis,
especially in the study of alternative market mechanisms,” I think many expected him to
catalogue the major findings of experimental economics in his prize lecture. 1 David Porter has
described Vernon as a live, interactive version of the Journal of Economic Literature. But Vernon
Smith is no cataloguer. He is a synthesizer, and he synthesizes acutely aware that scientific inquiry
is not wholly objective, that he himself is part of the scientific process. In his book, Rationality in
Economics, Vernon quotes the Goethean scholar of science Henri Bortoft in the epigraph to
chapter 10:
Science believes itself to be objective, but is in essence subjective because the witness is
compelled to answer questions which the scientist himself has formulated. Scientists
never notice the circularity in this because they hear the voice of “nature” speaking, not
realizing it is the transposed echo of their own voice (Bortoft, 1996; p. 17).

As a reader of the chemist and philosopher of science Michael Polanyi, Vernon might push back
a little on Bortoft and say that science is neither wholly objective, nor wholly subjective. Rather,
science is personal. In so far as science establishes contact with the external world, like in a
laboratory experiment, it is not subjective; but in so far as our inquiry is guided by individual
passions to learn something, it is not objective either (Polanyi, 1956; p. 315). Designing and
conducting economic experiments is, as Ludwig Wittgenstein says of philosophy, “really more a
working on oneself. On one’s own interpretation. On one’s way of seeing things. (And what one
expects of them)” (1980; p. 16e).
What do I mean by that? Consider Vernon’s first economic experiment published in the
Journal of Political Economy, the now canonical double auction experiment (1962). As I have
heard him say many times, Vernon conducted his experiment in the spring of 1956 with the
expectation that the results would deviate from the competitive equilibrium. Note how it was
personal. His priors, his way of thinking about the world, were that the competitive equilibrium
would fail to organize the data with private information, but he was curious to see what might
happen. He had a passion to explore his own interpretation of his economics training. Nature
wasn’t speaking to him. The transposed echo of his own voice led him to formulate the question
and experiment.
He was surprised then when the first session converged so readily and efficiently to the
competitive equilibrium. That was not, as he has said, what his “Harvard education” had taught
him would happen. In case it was fluke, he ran another session with the same result. Then he
started tinkering with the parameters: inducing unequal surplus for buyers and sellers, shifting
1
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the demand the curve, and changing the elasticity of supply at the competitive equilibrium. And
the markets continued to converge to the competitive equilibrium (Smith, 1962). With Arlington
Williams he continued pushing the boundaries of the environment such that one side of the
market would have zero surplus at the competitive equilibrium, and he experimented with
different types of institutions such as posted offer, posted bid, and sealed bid-offer auction
(Smith and Williams, 1982 and 1990).
Similarly, when Vernon and his co-authors, Gerry Suchanek and Arlie Williams, applied
the double auction institution to their famous asset market experiment, they expected to
establish a baseline with no bubbles (1988). What they found was that transparency was not
sufficient to prevent bubbles. Again, he made changes to the experiment, adding short selling
and conducting it with professional traders, and still the markets bubbled. The subjects
disabused him (his often-used word) of his way of seeing things.
The result of the double auction research program was more than a nuanced
understanding of the dynamic paths to the competitive equilibrium. In an article published in
Economic Inquiry twenty years after his first double auction paper appeared in print, Vernon was
still thinking about how the double auction experiment had changed how he thought about
markets (1982). The point of the double auction experiment is not simply that participants find
the point at which supply and demand cross, thereby objectively validating what we teach in
principles of microeconomics. The point of the double auction experiment, or “the most
significant fact about this [price] system,” as Hayek famously puts it, “is the economy of
knowledge with which it operates, or how little the individual participants need to know in order
to be able to take the right action” (Hayek, 1945, pp. 526-7). In the form of bids and asks, the
institution communicates all the information about everyone else that an individual needs to
know. The problem that society faces—and that a double auction market amazingly solves in a
mere few minutes—is how to aggregate and utilize the dispersed knowledge of the participants
so as to secure the most efficient use of resources.
If we suspend our own beliefs about what we need to know to solve our models or teach
a graph, and listen to what our participants say through their actions, the double auction
experiment changes how we think about the price system. The problem is not just about how
we think about equating marginal costs with marginal revenue, but how real people think and go
about their very real problem of buying and selling. To sincerely listen to our laboratory
participants means to take seriously the notion that our participants may not see the problem as
we see the problem, which is rather humbling. To quote Wittgenstein again, “The edifice of your
pride has to be dismantled. And that is terribly hard work” (1980; p. 26e).
Vernon, though, makes it look easy. He is one of the most self-effacing scholars I know;
he sets a high bar both in the laboratory and in everyday life. And it is that genuine modesty and
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honesty with himself and others that comprises the lens by which he has made a career of
burning points, the most significant of which is his example of how a model scientist and human
being thinks about economic science.
References
Bortoft, Henri. 1996. The wholeness of nature: Goethe's way of science. Edinburgh: Floris.
Hayek, Friedrich A. 1945. The use of knowledge in society. American Economic Review 35:51930.
Levitt, Steven D., and John A. List. 2007. What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social
Preferences Reveal about the Real World? Journal of Economic Perspectives 21:153-174.
Polanyi, Michael. 1956. Personal knowledge: Towards a post-critical philosophy. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Smith, Vernon L. 1962. An experimental study of competitive market behavior. Journal of
Political Economy 70:111-137.
Smith, Vernon L. 1982. Markets as economizers of information: Experimental examination of
the “Hayek hypothesis”. Economic Inquiry 20:165-179.
Smith, Vernon L. and Arlington W. Williams. 1982. Effect of rent asymmetries in experimental
auction markets. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3:99-116.
Smith, Vernon L., Gerry L. Suchanek, and Arlington W. Williams. 1988. Bubbles, crashes, and
endogenous expectations in experimental spot asset markets. Econometrica 56:11191151.
Smith, Vernon L., and Arlington W. Williams. 1990. The boundaries of competitive price theory:
Expectations, convergence and transaction cost. In Advances in Behavioral Economics,
vol. 2, edited by L. Green and J.H. Kagel. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Smith, Vernon L. 2003. Constructivist and ecological rationality in economics. American
Economic Review 93:465-508.
Smith, Vernon L. 2008. Rationality in economics: Constructivist and ecological forms. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1980. Culture and value. Translated by Peter Wench, edited by G. H. von
Wright and H. Nyman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

